Abstract-It has recently been discovered that using pseudorandom sequences as carriers in spread-spectrum techniques for data-hiding is not at all a sufficient condition for ensuring data-hiding security. Using proper and realistic apriori hypothesis on the messages distribution, it is possible to accurately estimate the secret carriers by casting this estimation problem into a blind source separation problem. After reviewing relevant works on spread-spectrum security for watermarking, we further develop this topic to introduce the concept of security classes which broaden previous notions in watermarking security and fill the gap with steganography security as defined by Cachin. We define four security classes, namely, by order of creasing security: insecurity, key security, subspace security, and stegosecurity. To illustrate these views, we present two new modulations for truly secure watermarking in the watermark-only-attack (WOA) framework. The first one is called natural watermarking and can be made either stegosecure or subspace secure. The second is called circular watermarking and is key secure. We show that circular watermarking has robustness comparable to that of the insecure classical spread spectrum. We shall also propose information leakage measures to highlight the security level of our new spread-spectrum modulations.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
INCE the first attempts of defining steganography and watermarking security, there have been obvious similarities between the two notions. We shall motivate our views with remarks that encompass steganography and watermarking. The concept of steganography has been first defined with modern terminology in Simmons' founding work on subliminal channels and his prisoners' problem [1] . Following Simmons, Alice and Bob are in jail and they want to, possibly, devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-looking cover contents. These messages are to be conveyed to one another by a common warden who eavesdrops all contents and can choose to interrupt the communication if they appear to be stegocontents. In this particular case, Eve is called a passive warden. This setup was commonly regarded as Simmons' original problem in which the security of the communication process is only partially affected: the transmission channel can be broken indeed, but it cannot be read or modified by the warden. However, considering the introduction of [1] , one reads: "The warden is willing to allow the prisoners to exchange messages in the hope that he can deceive at least one of them into accepting as a genuine communication from the other either a fraudulent message created by the warden himself or a modification by him of a genuine message." Actually, since the very beginning, Simmons stated his prisoners' problem with an active warden who can affect the security of the communication process. The tasks of Eve can be very different in essence, she may want to: 1) detect whether Alice and Bob share hidden messages, and if yes: 2) estimate their hidden messages; 3) tamper their communications. One also has to note that both passive/active behaviours of Eve (i.e., permitting only innocuous messages to be transmitted and tampering with Alice and Bob's communications-provided estimation is required prior to tampering) are of equal importance to her. Strangely enough, modern steganographers usually cast the steganalysis problem into a detection problem and restrict it to the passive behavior of the warden. Works such as Cachin's [2] and more recently Ker's [3] follow this research line. We are, however, aware of a new research line in data-hiding security relying on complexity [4] . This work does not follow this line and relies on information-theoretic arguments.
It is useful to distinguish between Cachin and Ker setups from now on. In Cachin's setup, Eve is supposed to perform a test for every and each separate content being circulated between Alice and Bob: Eve does not perform any accumulation of the (possibly stego) contents. Extending Cachin's setup, Ker [3] introduced the concept of batch steganography and pooled steganalysis in which the hidden message is to be disseminated over a set of (possibly non) marked contents. In Ker's views, accumulation of the contents can improve Eve's knowledge.
In other recent works on steganography, an active warden was only supposed to jam [5] the communication channel between Alice and Bob, not to tamper with the message itself. Although highly interesting, this point of view does not fit our approach of the game between the warden and the prisoners.
The framework proposed by Simmons should be related to the definitions of watermarking security given two decades after. Definitions proposed by Comesaña et al. [6] claim that "attacks to security are those aimed at gaining knowledge about the secrets of the system (e.g., the embedding and/or the detection keys)." This definition is coherent with the definition proposed earlier by Kalker [7] : "watermark security refers to the inability by unauthorised users to have access to the raw watermarking channel." It implies that it is not possible to either modify the embedded information or to copy it to another content if the watermarking scheme is secure: although it is always possible to modify the embedded information, a secure scheme does not allow control on how this information is modified. Performing an attack that estimates the secret key used for embedding and then copying the embedded message to other content using the estimated key is a threat on the security of a watermarking scheme. Obviously, Comesaña's and Kalker's definitions, along with Simmons' active warden, present useful insights to devise a common approach to data-hiding embedding security, encompassing both watermarking and steganography.
A. Description of Attacker's Knowledges and Behaviours
Watermarking security was first considered from the point of view of security level assessment. In [8] , the Diffie and Hellman methodology is adapted to digital watermarking and yields a classification of the attacks according to the type of information Eve has access to:
• a known-message attack (kma) that occurs when an attacker has access to several pairs of watermarked contents and corresponding hidden messages; • a known-original attack (KOA) that occurs when an attacker has access to several pairs of watermarked contents and their corresponding original versions; • a watermark-only attack (WOA) that occurs when an attacker has only access to several watermarked contents. This classification has been further extended with the constant-message attack (CMA) [9] where the attacker observes several watermarked contents and only knows that the unknown hidden message is the same in all contents.
This classification also pertains to data hiding in general. Obviously, the WOA setup is clearly related to the prisoners' problem: Eve can only be sure to observe stego (or not) contents (this is not a KOA setup since she cannot observe pairs of original and stegocontents) and, without some social engineering, she cannot know about the hidden messages (KMA is a very strong assumption for this problem).
Another issue with information security is the way the wellknown Kerckhoffs' principle is applied [13] . The Kerckhoffs' principle states that Alice and Bob shall only rely on some previously shared secret for privacy. It also states that Alice and Bob must consider that Eve knows everything about their communication process but their secret. We found little trace of the Kerckhoffs' principle in the data-hiding literature, namely:
• in [2] , the principle is said to be respected because of the very existence of a secret key; • in [8] , the authors allow Eve to know about the decoder; • in [14] , it is even assumed that Eve knowing anything about Alice and Bob's communication process is too "strong" of an assumption. Summarizing the aforementioned considerations, it appears that Simmons' original prisoners' problem was cast into a detection problem that only addresses the passive behavior of the warden. We believe it is due to the well-known relationship between the Kullback-Leibler divergence and statistical tests [2] . We also believe a more damageable issue is to somewhat neglect the prudent Kerckhoffs' principle when dealing with data-hiding security.
This paper aims at look back at the prisoners' problem (or equivalently to stay in the WOA setup) with the following assumptions in mind: 1) Eve may take a greater advantage on Alice and Bob if she allows them to communicate, even if she detects stegocontents (i.e., introduce some sort of conspiracy theory in the game); 2) the warden and the prisoners all performed a detailed Ker- ckhoffs analysis of the way secret information is embedded into host contents. The first assumption is somewhat related to Ker's pooled steganalysis [3] : Eve implicitly stores the contents circulating between Alice and Bob. This means that in our framework, we assume a twofold strategy for Eve: the first step is devoted to the analysis of the marked contents and the second step is the attack of transmitted contents. In the first step, Eve can analyze stegocontents at will to try to estimate the secret key shared by Alice and Bob: her role is merely to act as a passive warden. In the second step, Eve will act as an active warden: if she knows she did accumulate enough information on the secret key, she will either try to jam the hidden channel or tamper with it.
Like other works, we consider Alice and Bob use only one key. Of course, in real applications, especially in steganography, it is highly desirable to change the key at every communication between Alice and Bob. However, conservative worst-case security analysis (from the prisoners' point of view) can be based on such an assumption.
We shall eventually illustrate our views with spread-spectrum (SS)-based data-hiding techniques, of which two are new. This paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the so-called embedding security classes, Section III develops some views on SS-based data-hiding security, Section IV illustrates a simple SS-based scheme designed to provide provably secure undetectability, Section V illustrates another SS-based data-hiding scheme designed to improve the robustness of the previous one. Finally, Section VI presents a theoretical and practical evalutation of the security of the presented schemes.
II. EMBEDDING SECURITY CLASSES
We are aware that Simmons' original problem dealt with messages. Without loss of generality, we shall, however, consider that Alice and Bob exchange contents that can either be innocent or stegocontents. We depict in Fig. 1 the general setting known as the prisoners' problem.
Like Simmons, we consider Alice and Bob beforehand found a way to share a common secret, called the key. We pay no attention to the key channel anymore. Unlike Simmons, who worked with messages emanating from authentication protocols, we shall distinguish a coding/decoding stage and an embedding/extraction stage in Alice and Bob's communication process (see [15] for a more detailed analysis of the hidden channel).
To us, the coding stage relates to the way the binary message is transformed into one codeword . This transformation can be done using the host content feature vector in the case of informed coding [16] , [17] . The stegovector is afterwards generated during the embedding stage taking into account both and (in watermarking this is related to using some sort of informed embedding [19] , [25] or not [18] ). Implicitly, we consider that contents are to be represented by their real-valued feature vector. Note that it is important to make the distinction between the embedding scheme and the coding scheme: the embedding scheme defines the way the codewords are embedded in the host signal, the coding scheme defines the way the codewords are generated according to different requirements (robustness to different categories of noises, tracing, etc.).
Following Cachin's model, Alice might want to fool Eve by (possibly randomly) sending either or . Thus, the 0/1 switch is before the input of the public channel. This switch is to be discussed later on in Section II. Similar to Ker [3] , we also assume several contents are to be sent to Bob through Eve. Note that we implicitly assume that Eve, since she can be an active warden, has full read/write access to Alice and Bob's contents. Similar to Cachin, we assume Eve has some knowledge of what innocent content should look like. Moreover, contrary to most authors, we assume Eve can run the embbeding and extraction functions at will, with any key. And we assume Alice and Bob are aware of that. Of course, Alice and Bob also can run these functions at will, with any key. This is where we restrict the application of Kerckhoffs' principle to the sole embedding and extraction functions in the prisoners' problem.
A. Notations for Security
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations:
• is the size of the hidden payload (in bits); • is the size of the stego or host vector (in samples); • is the number of observed contents; • is a set of vectors representing a collection of original contents, each element of is an -dimensional random vector;
• is a set of -long vectors representing a collection of stegocontents, each element of is an -dimensional random vector.
We also need to define what we consider a secret key in this work. We use the general formalism proposed by Costa [20] where the embedding process has to consider a set of couples (codewords and messages). The set of codewords can be defined by where represents the number of codewords. Each codeword is associated with an element of the set with , by an application . However, because our study only considers the WOA setup, we do not have any apriori knowledge of the embedded messages and consequently it is not possible to estimate the application . In this context, the secret key is reduced (and considered to be equal) to the set of codewords . Note that this definition implies that two keys and are different (we further use the symbol to denote the difference between two keys) if . Moreover, we define the set as the set of all possible keys , where is the number of possible keys. It should be noted that practically the secret key is generated using a seed that initializes a pseudorandom number generator with a given output repetition period (PRNG). Therefore, even if one transforms the output of a PRNG to obtain Gaussian signals, the set of possible Gaussian signals is related to the repetition period of the PRNG and is therefore countable.
B. Definitions of Embedding Security Classes
Applying Kerckhoffs' principle to the embedding function allows us to assume that both Alice and Eve can build a perfect estimation of different pdfs (espcially the pdf of the original contents and the pdf of the watermarked contents, see infra). The game of security is then defined taking into consideration the knowledge of:
• , the probabilistic model of host contents. Since we are considering the WOA setup, Alice, Bob and Eve are able to model the joint distribution of . This hypothesis stems from some sort of a worst-case consideration (from Alice and Bob's point of view), where the attacker was able to model the original contents.
• is the probabilistic model of watermarked contents. Each content has been watermarked using a different key. This model can be built by the attacker using his or her knowledge of the embedding function.
• is the probabilistic model of watermarked contents. Each content has been watermarked using the same unknown key . This is the model that the attacker can build while observing the collection of watermarked contents without any knowledge of the secret key.
• is the probabilistic model of watermarked contents. Each content has been watermarked using the same known key . This is the model that the attacker can build while applying the Kerckhoffs' principle (e.g., while embedding random messages into a collection of watermarked contents using his or her own key ). Since host contents are assumed to be independent, the previous models are the products of marginals [i.e.,
]. The same holds for , and
. Thus, the definitions of embedding security classes in the sequel also holds for the marginals. However, we prefer to use joint probabilities in order to highlight the fact that the pirate can accumulate several contents.
Finally, Eve's ultimate goal is to estimate the constant which maximizes the likelihood . Since Eve's behavior can be very different (depending whether she acts as a passive or as an active warden), we devise accordingly four security classes for the embedding function.
Definition 1 (Insecurity): An embedding function is insecure iff (if and only if)
and (1) An embedding function is then called insecure if a unique key exists whose associated model of watermarked contents with this key matches the model of the observations . 1 It implies that the maximum likelihood estimation of the secret key is possible, the worst method being the exhaustive search considering the different keys. However, we will see in the next section that more clever techniques are possible when an embedding function is insecure.
Definition 2 (Key Security): An embedding function is key secure iff card (2) We can define as the invariant subset of the key . Note that we obviously have . represents the set of keys which does not modify the probabilistic model of the observations. When a watermarking scheme is said to be insecure, we can claim that does not exist. If this subset is equal to , then the algorithm is called subspace secure (see next definition): since many authors in the literature coined the term private subspace for something close to the invariant subset, we later on will use the term invariant subspace instead of invariant subset.
Note that even if it is impossible to estimate the secret key for key security, it is possible to estimate the secret subspace and to reduce the uncertainty of the estimation of the secret key. The security of key-secure embedding schemes relies on the number of possible keys included in , which is . As we will further see in this paper, circular watermarking enables achieving key security and the invariant subspace associated with the key is included in a hypersphere.
Note that Doërr et al. defined the subspace related to a secret key for SS watermarking schemes as the set of all keys belonging to the hyperplane where the collection of watermarked signals share the same covariance matrix. We can call such subspace a covariant subspace. The definition of subspace invariance proposed in this paper is more accurate because the density functions are directly considered and not only their second-order statistics. Nevertheless it is important to have the possibility to estimate either the invariant subspace or the covariant subspace for security purposes. If one of these subspaces is known, then it is possible to decrease the robustness of the watermarking scheme regarding an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) attack, for example, and to design a random worst-case attack where the attacking vector belongs to the private subspace [22] .
Key security consequently means that it is impossible for the attacker to estimate the secret key even if it is possible to estimate the subspace . The concept of key security points out the existing thin frontier between data-hiding robustness and security. It deals with security because it states that the secret key cannot be disclosed and it deals with robustness because it allows random scrambling of the whole hidden information at low distortion. Consequently, we regard key security as the minimum required class when one does not want to allow unauthorized read/write access to the secret channel.
Definition 3 Subspace Security: An embedding function is subspace secure iff
Subspace security means that even in the case of an exhaustive search, Eve will not be able to distinguish between the right secret key and any wrong key. Consequently, it will be impossible for Eve to estimate the invariant subspace associated with the secret key . In other words, the conditional-pdf does not depend on the key which is equivalent to state that and are independent.
Note that subspace security implies key security: subspace security allows choosing any two keys and for which holds and obtains the property of key security.
It is also important to point out that, by definition, subspace security implies no information leakage between the watermarked contents and the key as defined by [23] . This is because subspace security states that the right key is equivalent to any other (wrong) key: Eve cannot extract any knowledge from her observations. Consequently Subspace-security (4) Definition 4 Stegosecurity: An embedding function is stegosecure iff (5) Stegosecurity states that knowledge of does not help to make the difference between and . Note that stegosecurity implies subspace security. However, subspace security does not imply stegosecurity. One example will be given in Section V of this paper. This definition implies that which is equivalent to a zero Kullback-Leibler divergence (definition of "perfect secrecy" proposed by Cachin [2] )
Stego-security (6) Practically, it says that it is impossible for Eve to decide whether content has been processed through the embedding function or not (the 0/1 switch of Fig. 1 ). One can finally summarize the relationships between embedding security classes with the diagram of Fig. 2 .
C. stego, subspace, and key security
As proposed in [2] , another way to measure similarities between density functions is to use the Kullback-Leibler divergence which is equal to 0 when . If , it is possible to perform binary hypothesis testing to decide whether the scheme belongs to a specific class of security (either stego, subspace, or key security). Consequently, if we call the probability that Eve does not detect the class of the scheme and the probability that Eve decides that the scheme belongs to a class when it is wrong, then (see [2, Theor. 2]) (7) It is afterwards possible to translate our definitions of stegosecurity, subspace security and key security into, respectively, stegosecurity, subspace security, and key security. 
D. Possible Attacks
According to which security class the embedding function belongs to, Eve has several options.
1) If the scheme is stegosecure, she cannot obtain any information from the transmitted contents. 2) if the scheme is subspace secure but not stegosecure, Eve is not able to estimate (neither ), but she is able to distinguish stegocontents from innocent ones (e.g., she will be able to perform steganalysis). The embedding function does not respect Cachin's perfect secrecy but it is still secure for watermarking in the way defined by [23] .
3) If the scheme is key secure but not subspace secure, Eve shall be able to estimate, given enough observations, 2 the subspace but not the secret key . She will be able to concentrate the energy of her attack into the invariant subspace of the codewords. Practically, this means that it will be possible to jam the message with a smaller distortion than in the previous case. 4) If the scheme is insecure, the estimation of is possible and the security of the system is bound to be broken. She will be able to have access to the covert channel. More precisely, in a pure WOA framework, she will be able only to notice differences between hidden messages or flip the bits while minimizing the distortion (knowledge of some messages is needed to gain full read-write access to the hidden channel). In the sequel, we shall present examples of SS-based schemes that are stegosecure, subspace secure, and key secure. Their performances are to be assessed against those of I/SS [25] , which have already been shown to be insecure [8] .
III. ON SS-BASED DATA-HIDING SECURITY
This section first presents the principles of two popular SS watermarking schemes. We afterwards present an estimation technique that uses independent component analysis and enables estimating the secret key of an SS watermarking scheme when it is possible. Note that this attack is devoted to the class of SS schemes, and that other estimation methods can be used according to the watermarking scheme or the host statistics. For example, subGaussian watermark components can be estimated using blind source separation techniques [10] and for other schemes that use informed coding, clustering [11] , or setmembership approaches [9] can be used.
A. SS Embedding
We borrow notations from [8] . Let be a host vector in which we want to hide a message . Let be the rate of the data-hiding channel Further, we need a secret key used to initialize a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) in order to obtain secret carriers . Using Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, we can ensure that Further, we normalize each such that
This means that for large enough, we can assume that since a Gaussian PRNG is expected to produce a zero-mean output . From Eve's point of view, and are an equivalent representation of the secret. We implicitly assume that Eve will focus on the rather than on . Note that due to the constraints on the norm of the carriers, the different keys are located on the -hypersphere of radius that belongs to . Using a modulation , we are able to construct the watermark signal (11) Classical SS uses a modulation called BPSK modulation (12) where allows achieving a given distortion. A more efficient modulation (from the robustness point of view) is the linear approximation of the improved spread spectrum (ISS) [25] (13) where and are computed to achieve average distortion and to minimize the error probability. One also generally wants to achieve a desired watermark-to-content power ratio (WCR) in decibels, or possibly an expectation of it (14) Without loss of generality, we can assume that since we can consider that the power ratio of the carriers and the host signal are taken into account in the modulation process. Additionally, we also assume additive embedding to construct the watermarked signal (15) Using the correlation (normalized by ) between a vector and a carrier (16) one can deduce the simple decoding rule to output the estimated message from a potentially attacked version of if if (17) A common way in the watermarking community to assess robustness is to add AWGN to the watermarked vector. Later on, we shall therefore add noise for BER simulations. The power of the attack will be expressed in terms of the watermarked-content-to-noise power ratio (WCNR) (18) Moreover, let be the number of observations Eve has access to. In the sequel, we generally use matrices as column-wise collections of several realizations of a template vector. For example, is the matrix of watermarked contents Eve has collected, and is the matrix of modulated messages.
data-hiding operations are described as (19) In the sequel, we assume all host signals are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noises with pdf. A hypothesis of utmost importance is that the messages are supposed to be independently drawn according to the Bernouilli distribution. Also, we will denote as the pdf of the host vector, the pdf of the watermarked vector, and the pdf of the watermarked vector given the knowledge of the carriers, respectively.
B. SS-Based Embedding Security and ICA
To study the (in)security of any SS watermarking scheme, we have to estimate . Since is modeled by an i.i.d. Gaussian process and since is constant, the security of this scheme relies on the possibility to estimate the density of the modulation . It is important to point out that (19) states that binary phaseshift keying (BPSK)-based spread-spectrum watermarking can be seen as a noisy mixture of carriers. Noise is the original content and the mixture is parameterized by the modulation of the message. In this setup, the problem of carriers estimation is just what is commonly known as BSS. Given proper apriori knowledge, one typically wants to recover (the sources in BSS theory) and possibly (the mixing matrix in BSS theory). It is very insightful to notice that on one hand one advantage of BSS theory is that it makes no assumption on the mixing matrix, but only on , the sources. On the other hand, other methods may use the fact that the columns of are orthogonal to perform its estimation [12] .
Given our fundamental hypothesis that the messages are drawn independently and that the carriers are scaled orthonormal, the projection of each carrier gives independent components and our attacker shall therefore rely on ICA to achieve his or her goal.
To assess the insecurity of an SS-based technique, we have decided to adopt the following methodology which is generally used in BSS benchmarks.
1) We generate observations of watermarked contents and generate the matrix of observations . 2) We whiten the observed signals using principal component analysis. A reduction of dimension is therefore performed to reduce the searching time. If we consider that each host signal is generated from an i.i.d. process, the subspace containing the secret key will be included in a -dimensional space of different variance [26] . We consequently select the subspace generated by eigenvectors corresponding to the highest eigenvalues. 3) We run the FastICA algorithm [27] on this subspace to estimate the independent components and the independent basis vectors (e.g., the secret carriers). 4) We compute the normalized correlation between each original and estimated carrier. A value of close to 1 means that the estimation of the component is accurate.
An estimation close to 0 means that the estimation is erroneous. For , we may evaluate the estimation accuracy by plotting a 2-D constellation of points of coordinates . Successful estimation will then provide a point close to one of the four cardinal points . 3 We have applied this ICA-based carrier estimation for both SS and ISS embedding. Fig. 3 depicts the normalized correlation between the original and estimated carriers for 100 experiments considering each time 1000 watermarked vectors. We can notice that the estimations are globally more accurate for SS than for ISS with the BSS technique we used. In this case, this is mainly due to the fact that the variance of the watermarked signal after ISS is smaller than that after SS and consequently reduces the accuracy of the subspace estimation. Both SS and ISS were experimented with at the same level of distortion: the watermark-to-content ratio (WCR) was set to 21 dB.
Please note that ICA algorithms also have two fundamental limitations (due to seeking independent components) which encompass those defined in the previous section: 1) it cannot recover the correct ordering of the mixing matrix columns; 2) it outputs vectors that are only colinear to the mixing matrix columns. This natural disinclination means that in the WOA setup, the set of carriers and their opposites will be considered as representing the very same key. In this context, key security will be achieved only if it is impossible to estimate a secret carrier even up to a sign as shown in the following sections.
In Fig. 4 , we depict the plot of for traditional SS and ISS [25] : when the sources are not Gaussian nor dependent, one can observe clusters oriented according to the positions of the secret carriers. Dependency and Gaussianity are two solutions to prevent such clusters from arising. Theses ideas are explained in the next section.
However it is important to point out that any ICA algorithm is known to fail (i.e., it outputs random sources and mixing matrix) in the two following cases:
Case 1) the sources are not independent; Case 2) the sources are i.i.d. Gaussian signals of same variance. Therefore, a successful approach to forbid accurate estimation of the carriers is to artificially make the sources become Gaussian and i.i.d. (Section IV) or dependent (Section V).
IV. NATURAL WATERMARKING
The goal of this section is to devise a secure SS-based watermarking scheme for the WOA framework. Natural watermarking (NW) was named after its ability to (possibly) preserve the original pdf of the distribution of during embedding (i.e.,
). First, provided that has a symmetrical 
A. NW as SI Model-Based Watermarking
NW modulation uses side information (SI) at the encoder to increase security, whereas it has been common during the last years to use it for increasing robustness [19] . NW can be seen as the SS version of model-based steganography [29] .
NW modulation is defined as (21) This modulation is more easily viewed as a model-based projection on the different vectors followed by a scaling along the direction of . NW basically checks whether lies on the desired side of the Gaussian curve, see Fig. 5 . If not, it simply performs a model-based symmetry before applying scaling. Also note that the condition for correct decoding is obviously (22) From the security point of view, the original Bernouilli modulations are modified according to the values of the projection which have Gaussian distribution. Again, by CLT argument, we have for large enough (23) The fact that the sources in NW follow a Gaussian distribution ensure that NW is at least key secure under our assumptions (WOA framework and independent messages), see Section VI-B. This clearly relates to the inability of ICA to separate sources in this case.
Since we assume ( is the identity matrix of size ), one has obviously with only if . This means that NW is stegosecure for . Otherwise, it is just key secure. Indeed, having implies that subspace security cannot be met. A similar result was already found by other means [30] , [31] : the authors forced Gaussian stegodistributionto to be the same as the Gaussian cover-distribution by means of adequate scaling.
B. NW Features
From Appendix A, we have the following theoretical expectation of WCR for NW (which is actually a lower bound): (24) We confirm on Fig. 6 that there is no difference between this last approximation and the practical measurements. This last plot was performed targeting stegosecurity but the WCR expectation was found to be equally adequate when . Note that considering is meaningless, see (22) . Additionally, the expression of the BER for the AWGN channel is the following (see Appendix B):
(25) with If one wants to specify a target average WCR, the parameter has the following expression: (26) Therefore, the maximum number of bits to be securely hidden (i.e., ) in is (27) Fig . 9 shows the performance of NW compared to other SS-based schemes. It is not surprising that SS always outperforms NW since it has a security constraint to meet that SS does not have to. Another remark is that NW does not achieve stegosecurity when the cover distribution is not Gaussian: in this case, it only achieves subspace security if or key security if . This means that for practical applications, NW can only be used to embed some hidden information into noisy components. This conclusion somewhat complies with Fridrich's advice to use noisy images for steganography [32] . All in all, NW is more a theoretical scheme than a practical one.
C. NW for Stegosecurity:
When , NW simply amounts to the implementation of the well-known Householder reflection. We depict on Fig. 7 , the distribution of the projection of two secret carriers on watermarked contents. We can see that neither cluster nor principal directions arise with NW, all other parameters being equal to SS and ISS embedding depicted in Fig. 4 . Note also that the theoretical and practical evaluations of the security of NW will be evaluated in Sections V-D and VI. It is not possible to estimate the secret keys because the Gaussian joint distribution of the projection of the carriers in the watermarked contents is circular (see below) and, consequently, any estimation of independent components (the carriers) is hopeless [33] . More im- portant, circularity implies the definition of key security since all the carriers that belong to the hypersphere provide the same density functions. Fig. 7 presents the Gaussian joint distribution of two carriers. As we can see, it is not possible to find the directions that are associated with each carrier.
V. CIRCULAR EMBEDDING AND WATERMARKING
Looking back at Figs. 4 and 7, it is clear that NW robustness can get much better by improving the separation of the decoding regions. It is the goal of the coding technique that we describe in this section under the term of circular watermarking (CW).
A. CW Definition
One can easily check that the joint distribution of the projections of the secret carriers on the host signal using NW is circular.
Let be the joint distribution of the projection of the secret carriers on the host signal. Formally, we call circular any watermarking scheme which exhibits the following property: (28) where Incidentally, note that NW is clearly circular because in that case we have
B. Practical Implementation of CW Based on ISS
While (28) leaves many degrees of freedom for devising a circular watermarking scheme, we present a practical implemen- tation here based on the well-known ISS modulation [25] . We could also have based our implementation on classical SS, but certainly at the cost of lower robustness. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to this very implementation as CW in the sequel. The basic idea is to randomly spread the clusters of ISS (which are depicted on Fig. 4) on the whole decoding regions while preserving the circularity.
To this aim, let us construct a normalized [34] vector from another random vector . Each coefficient is constructed as follows: (29) This vector will be independently drawn at each embedding and uniformly distributed on the positive orthant of the hypersphere. Our CW implementation requires exactly the same computations for ISS parameters and [25] , which we intentionally omit here (30)
C. CW Features
Naming of the vector in (29) was chosen on purpose, since CW offers an analogy with the well-known distortion-compensated dither modulation [35] (DC-DM) watermarking scheme where the dither is used to hide the location of the quantization cells. However, note that, by construction CW is invariant to the scaling attack, contrarily to DC-DM schemes. We show in Fig. 8 the analogies of Figs. 4 and 7 for CW. Since CW renders carrier modulation jointly circular, we obtain dependency among message modulations; thus, even powerful practical BSS attacks [36] are hopeless when using CW. There are no independent directions to allow for reliable carrier estimation using ICA.
Additionaly, the expression of the BER for the AWGN channel is given in Appendix C. We depict Fig. 9 for the BER comparison between SS, ISS, NW, and CW. We believe this figure points out what the true cost of security is for SS-based watermarking techniques. Interestingly enough, at a typical WCR of 21 dB, CW performs close to SS but is always outperformed by ISS. At higher WCR, however, ( 15 dB), the performance of CW compared to other modulations degrades.
D. Evaluation of NW and CW Security Using BSS
The aim of this section is to assess the theoretical properties of NW and CW. We have used the estimation setup proposed in Section III-B for classical SS and ISS considering the same parameters . The distortion for NW remains the same ( 21 dB). Normalized correlations between the two estimated and original carriers are depicted in Fig. 10 for 100 different trials. For NW, the estimation of the secret carriers is unsuccessful because every point is very close to the origin for each trial. The CW plot illustrates the fact that in this case, the watermark subspace is estimated (the distance between each point and the origin is close to 1), but that the estimation of the two carriers is not possible because each trial leads to a point which seems to be randomly chosen on the unitary circle.
VI. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY OF NATURAL AND CIRCULAR WATERMARKING
A. Information-Theoretic Constraints
As was done previously, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, we assume in the following notations that is a set of random vectors, each of size and that is a set of random carriers, each of size . Consequently, represents a random vector of size and represents a random vector of size . The assessment of the security of a data-hiding scheme has been already proposed by Cachin [2] and extended to the WOA, KOA, and KMA scenarios by Comesaña et al. [6] . It is defined by the mutual information between the observed watermarked contents and the secret key that has been used to watermark these contents, given the hypothesis that the secret key is constant for each realization of a set of watermarked random vectors . In the case of WOA, it can be written as
The definition of mutual information is linked with the differential entropy by the relation (32) It has been shown [6] that perfect secrecy may be achieved iff (33) which means that and are independent sets of random vectors and that it is not possible to gain any information about observing .
B. Theoretical Evaluation of Security for Nonrobust Natural Watermarking
In this section, we propose calculating the different pdfs and and then applying (32) to compute the information leakage. Considering the embedding formula, for , we have, considering all of the different possibilities of embedding By grouping the second and third terms together and the first and the fourth term, this is equivalent to (34) where represents the identity matrix of size . Under the i.i.d. host signal distribution assumption, the last pdf of (34) is equal to [37] . Furthermore, is an elementary reflection and an orthogonal matrix so and we obtain (35) If is composed of a set of orthogonal different carriers and we can perform the analysis presented before for each carrier independently, (35) is still valid. If , it is also possible to decompose the -watermarked observations as where is a orthogonal matrix. Finally, we have for all secret key and, consequently, the NW embedding is shown to be stegosecure in the case of i.i.d. Gaussian host signals. Moreover, using (35) and the Bayes' theorem, we have and we finally have (36) which means that there is no information leakage for NW when (37)
C. Practical Estimation of Mutual Information for Random Vectors
In the case that (robust NW) or the case of CW, the computation of (31) is not analytically tractable and consequently we have to use a practical estimation. This is essentially due to the fact that the pdf does not have any closed-form expression in those cases.
For low dimensions, practical solutions to compute differential entropy and mutual information are based on histogram and kernel-based pdf estimation [38] . However, when the dimension of the random vector is too high (greater than 3), such methods are not accurate enough because they suffer from the curse of dimensionality (the number of samples that are necessary to estimate the pdf grows exponentially with the number of variables). Consequently we have decided in our experiments to use an estimator of differential entropy based on K-nearest neighbor (KNN) [39] , [40] . The approximation of the differential entropy of a -dimensional vector is given by (38) where digamma function;
order of the nearest neighbor;
volume of the unitary -dimensional sphere; number of vectors considered; distance between the th vector and its th nearest neighbor.
This estimation function enables computing accurate estimation of the differential entropy of a random vector in high dimension. For example, for a vector composed of 10 i.i.d. normal components of respective variances , the theoretical entropy is equal to nats and after 100 trials, the average approximation obtained using (38) is 22.01 nats (variance of 0.005) for and .
D. Setup and Practical Results
This section uses (38) to derive an approximation of (32) and calculates the information leakage for the different schemes.
is computed by generating a set of realizations. Logically, one realization is computed by using the same key but different keys are used for each realization. The approximation is computed using also realizations, but in this case, all of the realizations are generated using an arbitrary fixed key. In our setup, we have chosen , and the value of the mutual information is an average after 100 trials. Fig. 11 depicts the mutual information considering only one observation and different embedding distortions for different SS-based watermarking schemes. The lowest distortion ( 3.0 dB) corresponds to the distortion obtained for nonrobust NW and
. From this figure, we can observe two important properties. First, the information leakage for nonrobust NW is equal to zero and the theoretical results presented from before are confirmed. Second, considering only one observation, we can order the security of the studied watermarking schemes: the scheme having the most important information leakage is ISS, it is also the one that offers the most important robustness. Then, CW and SS produce approximately the same information leakage with these parameters. Finally, NW, even with its robust implementation, is the most secure of the proposed schemes. Fig. 12 represents the approximation of the information leakage for the four schemes and an increasing number of observations. The practical results confirm again the results obtained in Section VI-B: there is no information leakage for NW even considering several observations. The information leakage for CW is lower than the information leakage for ISS or SS. Note, however, that the measure of mutual information does not enable distinguishing key secure schemes from nonsecure schemes. CW, which is key secure, produces positive information leakage and another measure should be used to define key security in an information-theoretic formulation taking into account . CW information leakage therefore corresponds to the progressive disclosure of the whole private subspace. Note that one might consider the WCRs of Figs. 11 and 12 to not be realistic. However, it was our intention to focus on WCRs leading to high information leakage values.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper aims at making a new entry in the field of framework-oriented papers for data hiding [41] . It proposed a detailed analysis of the security of the embedding function for data hiding following Kerckhoffs' principle. It leads to the definition of four security classes, which were illustrated by two new SS-based modulations for improved security. Stegosecurity is shown to be related to previous works on steganography. Subspace security establishes the thin line between data-hiding robustness and security: if it is impossible to estimate the private subspace, then no low-distorsion watermark removal is achievable. Key security focuses on the impossibility for an attacker to estimate anything but random estimates of the secret key. Insecurity relates to data-hiding schemes where estimation of the secret key is achievable. Natural watermarking can be made stegosecure if the host signal is i.i.d. Gaussian and ; otherwise, it is only subspace secure if or key secure if . Results show that NW has relatively poor robustness. On the other hand, circular watermarking was devised to increase robustness at the cost of achieving only key security which, we believe, offers good security for many applications. Results are further assessed using information leakage measures that exhibit the superior security of our two new modulations compared to classical or improved SS. We believe this work broadens the choice for data-hiding application designers when high security is needed. Future works include the application of these modulations to real media and subsequent assessment of security in the wild, possibly with the use of independent subspace analysis.
APPENDIX A WCR FOR NW
Like ISS, NW takes into account the very realization of the host signal. Therefore, we have to find the expectation of the WCR. The first point is to obtain the expectation of (39) Then, since and are considered independent variables, and by linearity of the expectation operator In what follows, we assume and are computed from [25] . The correlation with a Gaussian noise of law is Gaussian with a 2-D corresponding pdf (49) with .
The marginal pdf is (50)
After the circular implementation of ISS, we can assume that the pdf of the correlations with the carriers for watermarked contents if the first coded bit corresponds to 0 is given by if (51) if (52) with calculated from [25] and
The marginal pdf is given by (53) and must be computed numerically. The pdf of the correlation of the watermarked signal which undergoes noise is (54) and the probability of error is expressed as
Also note that these last two expressions have to be computed numerically.
